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For those who share a sense of frustration at reading scientists writing 
about philosophy and religion, or, conversely, at listening to 
philosophers and religious people discussing science, Brian Davies’ 
book starts well and offers high promise. The very first words of the 
Preface set the stage: “This book is about beliefs. It was born from my 
dissatisfaction with the attempts of many physicists to sell a vision of 
the world whose ‘objective’ character disregards what makes life 
interesting.” (1) What makes life interesting are esthetic and ethical 
values. These are part and parcel of a worldview in which we may 
believe or not. The worldview advocated by the author is “pluralist”: 
“we have limited mental capacities and will always need a multiplicity 
of ways at looking at the world in order to understand it as well as we 
are able. Even if the reductionist program never encounters a final road 
block, we will continue to need concepts such as purpose and 
meaning” (1).
It is true that we look at things in different ways according as we are 
looking at them as a scientist, a philosopher or a religious person. 
According to Bas van Fraassen (a philosopher), the scientific attitude is 
characterized by its objectivity as articulated at some length in his The 
Empirical Stance ( 2002 : 155–176). Understanding science is a daunting 
task. It is then slightly surprising to read in the section entitled “A 
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Definition of Science”: “Science can be described rather precisely. 
Indeed we can enlist the help of lawyers, because of a trial in the USA 
about whether creation science is indeed science” (189). This is 
followed by an excerpt of the ruling of Judge Jones in the “Intelligent 
Design” trial in 2004 in which science is described as a discipline in 
which testability by means of observable facts rather than recourse to 
religious authority is the acid test for the acceptance of a theory. This is, 
I believe, an important aspect of science, but perhaps not the only one. 
Davies correctly stresses that “One of the fundamental aspects of 
scientific thinking is that it does not depend upon the opinions or beliefs 
even of its greatest heroes” (189). From this and many other passages in 
the book, it is clear that the beliefs that matter are world-view beliefs 
and these do vary among scientists. Such beliefs, however, do not 
matter as far as the contents of scientific theories and their acceptance 
by the scientific community are concerned, at least in the long run. The 
beliefs that matter are the beliefs which deal which are important for 
guiding our lives, but eventually such beliefs do not have that much 
influence in the long-term evolution of science. Despite a large variety 
of creeds among them, scientists eventually come to accept a theory on 
the basis of its capacity to account for observations and experiment 
results. According to Davies, this is a historical fact.
In the first chapter, Davies begins his reflections on the nature of 
science by an overview of the scientific revolution in which he writes a 
few lines on some well-known major protagonists–Copernicus, Galileo, 
Descartes and Newton—and rightly stresses the impact of new 
technology, such as the inventions of the telescope, the microscope and 
accurate clocks. This chapter also contains brief criticisms of 
philosophers such as Popper and Feyerabend. The author mainly adopts 
an inductivist perspective which he claims to be in accordance with 
Newton’s take on induction. Davies writes: “Almost nobody seems to 
have commented on Newton’s claim in the General Scholium that the 
laws of motion including their applicability to the heavenly bodies had 
been obtained by induction from the phenomena. “(33) Pace Davies, 
many historians and philosophers of science (John Herivel, J. E. 
McGuire, Peter Machamer, etc.) have analyzed the role of induction 
both in Newton’s writings and his actual scientific practice. In the 
General Scholium of the Principia, Newton states “In this [natural] 
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philosophy, particular propositions are inferred [deduced, as he says 
earlier] from phenomena and afterwards rendered general by 
induction.” (Cohen and Westfall 1995 : 118–119). Significantly, the all-
important word “general” is missing in the author’s quotation of Rule 
IV (35). Newton’s “deduction” from phenomena has been widely 
discussed. As Herivel showed in 1965, Newton could not have deduced 
his laws of motion and certainly not the law of inertia, from 
phenomena, but found them instead by reflecting on some flaws in 
Descartes’ laws. Newton deduced the inverse square law of 
gravitational force not from phenomena but from Kepler’s laws and by 
relying on his dynamic laws; then, by induction, Newton made the law 
universal. Further in the book, Davies claims that according to Newton, 
God “did not need to act on them [planets]” (186). This is mistaken as 
the controversy between Clarke (Newton’s spokesman) and Leibniz 
shows.
In the second chapter, entitled “The Human Condition”, Davies makes a 
case in favor of “pluralism” which “does not imply anything about how 
the world is in itself. Rather it is the claim that we, as human beings, 
need multiple, context-dependent viewpoints in order to understand the 
world as best as we can” (44). The author defends an “updated version 
of one of Kant’s central claims: we interpret the world by using our 
innate capacities and in particular our strong disposition to interpret 
events in terms of causes and effects. We project these notions onto the 
world, and have no choice but to do so, because of our own 
natures” (72). I thinkbelieve that this contention is more Humean than 
Kantian. But, as Kant did, the author opposes a metaphysics which aims 
at knowing the basic constituents of the world in itself and at providing 
a unique description of the world as a whole. [Such metaphysical 
realism has been vigorously criticized by Putnam ( 1987 : 19)]. Davies 
successfully argues against ontological global reductionism but 
acknowledges the merits of “methodological reductionism” which 
consists in contextually approaching particular things under a specific 
point of view and focussing on some of their aspects. This reductive 
approach, made possible by abstraction, is essential to the objective 
attitude, which doesnevertheless does not preclude embracing a 
moderate realist position according to which parts of our best scientific 
theories are true of some unobservable portions of the world. Davies 
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believes in the existence of atoms, for example, and adheres to 
moderate realism, but does not offer a philosophical argumentation in 
favor. It is clear that Davies strongly opposes reifying mathematics and 
mathematical parts of scientific theories, a move which leads to 
unjustified world-view beliefs.
The third chapter “The Nature of Mathematics” is the most valuable 
part of the book, as expected from a first-rate mathematician such as 
Brian Davies. It contains many stimulating reflections on the various 
ways in which mathematicians understand their trade. Davies contrasts 
the dominant “classical” view, imbibed with Platonism, with 
alternatives such as formalism, intuitionism and constructivism. He 
highlights the merits of Errett Bishop’s constructivism in which all 
constructive proofs are also classical proofs. As an alternative to 
Platonism, Davies defends a pluralistic view, inspired from a” 
biologically and culturally based description of mathematics” (101). 
Such a view, it seems to me, can also be called “naturalist”. Davies 
says: “Mathematics is an aspect of human culture, just as language, law, 
music and architecture. Its vocabulary is highly specialized, and its 
domain of applicability excludes much of what we care about in our 
everyday lives” (101). Mathematical Platonism is characterized thus : 
“theorems are supposed to be true statements about timeless entities, 
and to be true whether or not they have ever been or will ever be 
formulated by human beings, and whether or not they have proofs. 
Platonists believe that the infinite set of natural numbers actually exists 
and has objective properties” (97). In my opinion, such a definition of 
Platonism does not contradict the description of mathematics given by 
the author unless one adds that mathematics is a mere aspect of human 
culture, a contention that a Platonist, as well as Davies, deny.
A large part of the third chapter is devoted to the critique of 
mathematical Platonism. Some mathematicians, such as Roger Penrose, 
appeal to intuition and to a direct vision of mathematical entities. Quite 
correctly, Davies points out that such intuitions are unreliable and that 
what counts in mathematics are proofs. Yet, resort to direct intuition is 
not mentioned in the above definition of mathematical Platonism. 
Davies also remarks that Platonism is irrelevant to mathematical 
practice. This is correct, but mathematical Platonism is a philosophical
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position andthat stands or fails irrespective of its good or bad influence 
on mathematical practice. Genuinely, philosophical arguments are 
wanted here. Davies examines with a critical eye various versions of the 
indispensability argument of mathematics in physics, such as Quine’s, 
and pays special attention to Eugene Wigner’s argument from the 
astonishing effectiveness of mathematics. In line with his naturalist 
position, Davies offers the following alternative explanation of the 
success of mathematics in natural sciences: “The astonishing things are 
the physical regularity and our ability to recognize it, not the 
[mathematical] language that we use to express it. Given the first two, 
we were bound to start developing the third eventually” (134).
The naturalist explanation offered by Davies surely is plausible. Our 
mathematics is the outcome of the evolution of our brains in the course 
of Darwinian evolution which could not have taken place without (real) 
regularities in nature. The widespread agreement among 
mathematicians depends on the universal structure of our brain and the 
constraints it imposes on acceptable proofs. This is a contingent fact, 
which, I take it, however is not per se incompatible with Platonism. 
HoweverYet, Davies does not claim to have proved Platonism to be 
false, but only to have shown that a plausible alternative, a pluralistic 
and naturalistic view of mathematics, has more merits (100).
The fourth chapter “Sense and Nonsense” accurately presents the 
standard model of elementary particle physics, its application in 
cosmology and some interpretations of these results. Davies 
appropriately counsels to avoid wild speculations which have no basis 
in observation. For example, the fact that the standard model does not 
explain the values of the fundamental constants in nature provides no 
justification for postulating the existence of an infinity of universes or 
“multiverses” in which all possible combinations of the values of these 
constants would be actualized. Such speculations have been fostered by 
the desire to avoid positing the existence of God who has purposely 
created our unique “fine-tuned” and extremely improbable universe in 
such a way that we humans will eventually come to existence. Davies 
cogently argues that no observation warrants the belief in the existence 
of multiverses and also that the existence of our special universe does 
not provide evidence for the existence of God. He is right on both 
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counts. Incidentally, I do not see why we could a priori reject the 
possibility that God might have created an infinity of multiverses. After 
all, Leibniz has argued that an infinite material universe is more in 
accordance with his unlimited almightiness than a finite one.
In the last chapter “Science and religion,” Brian Davies does not 
pretend “to prove or disprove the tenets of some or all religions by 
scientific analysis. One can simply try to understand why people have 
the beliefs that they do and examine their internal consistency and 
relevance to the ethical problems that scientific advances are 
posing” (187). Since the author truly claims that what people write 
about religious beliefs is heavily influenced by their own background, 
he consistently reveals that his father had abandoned his Baptist faith 
and that he was raised up in a non-religious atmosphere.
The author adopts a position which he calls “humanism.” “Humanists 
(…) have two characteristic beliefs. The first is that they do not accept 
statements or values based solely upon authority, but seek evidence 
before coming to judgements. In particular, they support the scientific 
enterprise. The second (…) is that humanists endeavor to improve 
themselves morally and to have compassion for all other people, not 
because of an expectation of reward in some future life, but for their 
own sake.” (187).
Davies acknowledges that religion is a much harder “concept” that 
science and that it is impossible to give a “definition” of religion. This 
is correct, because, as he stresses, “religion is much more than a matter 
of commitment to a particular set of theological propositions” (191). 
Indeed, to practice a religion is above all to try to live in a certain way.
After reviewing the various and incompatible beliefs entertained by 
scientists such as Galileo, Newton, Faraday, Gould, Dyson, Dawkins, 
Polkinghorne, Atkins and Coulson, the author correctly concludes that 
religious (or anti-religious) beliefs cannot be read off from science. 
Davies then reviewspresents and criticizes several arguments pro et 
contra the existence of God offered by Swinburne, Dawkins and Ward 
and rightly shows them to be unconvincing. Having done this, Davies 
concentrates on some claims of Christianism, namely virgin birth,1
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resurrection, demonic possession, naturally occurring evil, life after 
death and argues that they lack factual basis or are unclear or both. In 
passing, we are instructed (in case we did not know yet) that religious 
people have several times killed each other in the course of history, 
while Davies remains silent on the massive crimes of Hitler’s Nazis and 
Stalin’s and Mao Tse-Tung’s communists (but we also all know that). 
From all this, Davies advocates an agnostic position with respect to the 
existence of God and contends that humanism is the best position to 
adopt since it offers the best warrant for tolerance and respect of all.
Unfortunately, no belief, no matter how positive and sincere, have 
prevented the persons sharing them from performing evil actions. This 
is sadly applies to all of us, religious and non-religious, including 
humanists. Atheism and agnostic humanism also are world-view beliefs 
which as such are on a par with religious beliefs. Of course, 
incompatible beliefs cannot all be true. The agnostic and the religious 
cannot escapeescape from logic. Entertaining some belief implies 
believing that contrary beliefs are unsupported by evidence or false.
Besides, it is highly doubtful that even the most knowledgeable scientist 
comes to believe in any established scientific theory on the basis of 
“evidence”. Urging that the relevant evidence is accessible to some 
other scientists is an argument of authority. Such an attitude is 
obviously not irrational, but it does not harmonize well with the first 
humanist belief formulated above. Granted, it is hard to single out the 
kind of evidence which would qualify as justifying a religious belief. In 
Christianism (on which Davies focuses), evidence comes from personal 
loving encounter with God through Scripture and other believers, which 
is akin to the experience of falling in love. Surely, trust and faith in 
another person in a loving relationship do not originate in acquaintance 
with some sort of scientific, observational or instrumental, evidence; 
and Davies agrees on this.
Davies’ main target is fundamentalism, especially creationism and 
intelligent design. Although Davies does not clearly distinguish, as he 
should, the fact of evolution from the scientific explanation of this fact, 
he is correct to warn against the dangers of a literal reading of the bible 
and the anti-science attitude it fosters. The Catholic Church now 
Page 7 sur 10e.Proofing
12/06/2014http://springerproof.sps.co.in:8080/oxe_v2/printpage.php?token=8WStzd7KcENKd0c...
follows Augustine who, back in the fifth century, advised to revise an 
interpretation of the bible if it conflicts with well-established scientific 
facts and theories. The bible, however, remains the ground of Christian 
faith. It is then surprising that Davies never cites the bible but limits 
himself to (admittedly very interesting) quotations of Rowan Williams 
and Keith Ward.
Arguably, Christianism has played a major historical role in recognizing 
the highest value of compassion, love and respect of all. Its origin can 
be traced in Paul’s epistle to the Galatians: “There is neither Jew nor 
Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female. 
For you are all one in Christ Jesus” (3, 28). However, the interpretation 
of “respect of all” is perhaps not as clear as Davies thinks. Since most 
humanists are in favor of access to abortion (Davies is) and euthanasia, 
“respect of all” in some cases does not imply for them the inclusion 
ofof unborn babies to be born among human beings and the respect of 
everybody’s life. To say the least, these are controversial issues and the 
views on human beings and the respect they deserve might not be so 
much clearer as some, also controversial, theological statements. The 
same kind of interpretation problems applyapplies to the expression 
“improving oneself morally.”
Although I am (at least trying to be) a Catholic philosopher, I am not a 
theologian and I will thus refrain from discussing some central, yet 
admittedly hard to understand, Christian dogmas, which must be 
construed as grounding an authentically loving relationship with God 
and all other humans. Let me just observe that the “good thief” 
crucified with Jesus was not saved because of his good deeds, but 
because he recognized that Jesus was God (Luke 23, 39–43). True, there 
are religious people who perhaps perform good actions only for the sake 
of reward after death. However, this is not in accordance with the words 
of Jesus who said that good actions will be rewarded ifonly if they are 
done “for my name’s sake” (Matthew 19, 29). At any rate, God’s love 
and mercy hold for all, good and bad, believers or not, without 
exception.
As I said at the very beginning of this review, the scientific attitude is 
objective. On the contrary, the religious attitude is “holistic” (Ghins 
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2009 ), in the sense that it considers the whole person, and does not 
attempt to methodologically reduce her or him to a set of measurable 
characteristics. For the Christian tradition, God is not a “concept” to be 
“defined” but a person with whom we can have a personal relationship, 
how difficult this might be. Loving God and one’s neighbor cannot be 
separated (Matthew 22, 37–39). Persons are not objects, let alone 
scientific objects. Approaching and knowing persons require an attitude 
which is in many ways incompatible with the scientific objective 
attitude. This is why understanding the religious attitude necessitates 
distancing from the objective way of looking at things, a sort of 
conversion which seems to be difficult to achieve for westerners, 
especially when they are scientifically minded. If we want to tackle the 
thorny question of the relationship between science and religion, we 
should concentrate on religious and scientific practices and the distinct 
attitudes they exemplify, rather than on issues relating to the scientific 
contents of theories allegedly contradicting religious beliefs. Every 
word in the Gospel is a call to conversion, that is, to the radical change 
of attitude required to engage in genuinely loving relationships. This is 
why the main disagreements between science and religion—for 
example, on experiments dealing with human embryos—verge on the 
way of treating our fellow humans and of practically organizing society, 
including at the legislative level.
I fully agree with Brian Davies’ pluralist stance when he says that we 
have limited mental capacities and that we need a multiplicity of ways 
of looking at things to understand them as well as we can. I submit that 
the religious attitude is one of these ways, and a very stimulating and 
gratifying one at that. 
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